REASONS OF THE JELÂLÎ REBELLİONS

ABSTRACT

Reasons of Jelâlî rebellions that emerged in the second half of the sixteenth century and continued in the seventeenth century were examined under two titles as economiç reasons and other reasons. Economic reasons can include that The entering of American silver into the Ottoman State after Geographical Discoveries and the deterioration of Ottoman economics, increasing of the Ottoman popülation, bribery that according to some historians started in the second half of the sixteenth century, the breakdown of the fief system.  Other reasons include that wars involving the Ottoman State in the second half of the sixteenth century and in the first half of the seventeenth century, mistakes and glitches was done by the state officials and their applications, the situation of Ottoman forces and finally the historical legacy. The aim of the study is to show the effect of the Jelâlî rebellions on the Ottoman State and to show together discussions in available literatüre. Those discussions are that how should be Jelâlî’s defined, what were the practices of the Ottoman State, how did the Ottoman State benefit from Jelâlî’s. In this context, Karen Barkey has been mentioned a lot. Finally in this study, the rebellion was prefered as a concept. A general summary of the article is given in the conclusion part.

Keywords: Rebellion, Jelâlî Rebellions, Bribery, Anatolia, Fief system, Ottoman State.

 

TURKISH ABSTRACT

            On altıncı yüzyılın ikinci yarısında ortaya çıkan ve on yedinci yüzyılda devam eden Jelâlî isyanlarının nedenleri, ekonomik ve diğer nedenler olarak iki başlık altında incelenmiştir. Ekonomik nedenler şunları içermektedir: Coğrafi Keşiflerden sonra Amerakan gümüşünün Osmanlı Devleti’ne girmesi ve Osmanlı ekonomisinin bozulması, Osmanlı nüfusunun artması, bazı tarihçilere göre on altıncı yüzyılın ikinci yarısında başlayan rüşvet ve tımar sisteminin bozulması. Diğer nedenler ise şunları içerir: on altıncı yüzyılın ikinci yarısında ve on yedinci yızyılın ilk yarısında Osmanlı Devleti’nin içinde bulunduğu savaşlar, devlet görevlileri tarafından yapılan hata ve aksaklıklar ve bunların uygulamaları, Osmanlı askeri güçlerinin durumu ve nihayet tarihi miras. Çalışmanın amacı celali isyanlarının Osmanlı Devleti üzerindeki etkisini göstermek ve mevcut literatürdeki tartışmaları birlikte göstermektir. Bu tartışmalar Jelâlî’nin nasıl tanımlanması gerektiği, Osmanlı Devleti’nin uygulamaları neler olduğu, Osmanlı Devleti celâlîlerden nasıl yararlandığıdır. Bu bağlamda Karen Barkey çokça zikredilmiştir. Son olarak bu çalışmada rebellion kavramı tercih edilmiştir. Sonuç bölümünde makalenin genel bir özeti verilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İsyan, Celâlî İsyanları, Rüşvet, Anadolu, Tımar Sistemi, Osmanlı Devleti.

 

 

INTRODUCTION

           

            The reasons of the Jelâlî rebellions are traced back to the middle of the sixteenth century. At first, it appeared as Suhtes riots. Later, we can say that the increase in the population, the worsening of the agricultural situation, the conflict of the interests of the qadı and the beys in the fief system and similar reasons increased the Jelâlî rebellions and turned it into a peasant movement as we know it. If we touch on the difference between rebellion and revolts, we can explain as follows. Birol Gündoğdu quoted a small part of Ahmet Yaşar Ocak’s study and he said is that “isyan is referred to those armed movements, which emerged because of the offressions of central state. Nevertheless, kıyam is thought of referring to those armed uprisings, which did not stem from state pressure or injustice but which rather carry a irect political aim with an ideological background and messianic inspiration.”[1] Because of this statement, it is more correct to say the Jelâlî rebellions. Although Karayazıcı showed himself as a sultan, he never turned into action.

            This article was written within the framework of the works of Karen Barkey and Mustafa Akdağ. Karen Barkey’s work Eşkıyalar ve Devlet Osmanlı Tarzı Devlet Merkezileşmesi contains interesting information. Similar information can be found in Fatma Acun’s article titled Celâlî İsyanları (1591-1611). In this article, Peçevi Tarihi was used as the primary source and several pieces of adaletname in Halil İnalcık’s article named Adâletnâmeler were used. As the secondary sources used in this article, we can count the works of Fernand Braudel, Hammer, Feridun M. Emecen, Birol Gündoğdu, Yusuf Halaçoğlu, Norman Itzkowitz, Mücteba İlgürel, Mehmet Öz, Oktay Özel. Among these sources, there are four sources written in English. In addition, it was thought that it would be visually good to show the reasons in a table. Therefore, a table taken from Oktay Özel’s work is included.

The word Jelâlî in terms of meaning, in the period of Selim the first, in 1519, it is expressed as a member of Jelâl due to the Bozoklu Şeyh Jelâl rebellion that occurred.[2] However, every rebel who was harmed own by the people over time was named as Jelâlî, Köroğlu who revolted in 1580 was also remembered in this way. In addition, someone who appeared in Rumelia claiming to be a şehzade Mustafa was named Jelâlî. This person gathered men around Thessaloniki. He even gave a person named Üveyl Toğça as the grand vizier.[3] The Jelâlî rebellions are shown to have occurred since the second half of the 16th century. Therefore, Feridun Emecen mentions that since the first half of the 16th century, banditry activities weren’t lacking in Anatolia and Rumelia, and there was a constant movement in Anatolia.[4] Especially in Anatolia, the duties of the representatives of judicial and administrative affairs were mixed in the lands where sipahis with fief were grown. However, the manifestation of the Jelâlî rebellions is since the second half of the 16th century. This corresponds to the last period of Süleyman the first. Especially after the death of Süleyman the first, after the throne fight between his sons Bayezid and Selim, new Jelâlî formations were seen in Anatolia. While Mustafa Akdağ was handling the Jelâlî rebellions as a struggle, he included the sect revolts within the concept of rebellion.[5] He also stated that the Jelâlî rebellions were only among the Turks[6] because the economic superiority is in non-Turks.[7] Karen Barkey analyzed the Jelâlî rebellions around the centralization of the Ottoman State. According to Barkey, the efforts of the Jelâlî groups to get benefit from the state showed that these groups saw the state as the main power. According to her, the Ottoman State has managed to integrate these groups with itself with its flexible and partially contradictory policies.[8] In addition, In the adaletname dated 1595-96, The State was asked to write a surety for each other in the inspection of the kadıs to reveal the bandits.[9] In this article written in addition to the existing literature, the reasons of the Jelâlî Rebellions will be mentioned under two headings. Such a distinction has been made because the reasons are intertwined with each other.

 

1.      Economic Reasons

As a result of geographical discoveries, the abundant amount of American silver that Europe bought from the New World entered the Ottoman State in 1580. This can be counted among the reasons for economic deterioration. It can be seen that the Ottoman State was an intermediary in transferring this silver from West to east. The excessive increase in the silver stock caused the prices to rise in the Ottoman State as in all Mediterranean countries.[10] As akçe were more valuable, the State reduced the value of its own currency as a precaution to compete with American silver.[11] Because of this, some groups were angry. Mercenaries asked for wages that reduced inflation. As a result of the non-payment of these fees, a riot occurred. There were two rebellions between 1589 and 1591 and once in 1593.[12] In addition, the Ottoman State had to change its taxation practices to increase the amount of revenue flowing into the treasury. Karen Barkey stated that the real problem was that the Ottoman rulers tried to regulate the economy for factors such as increasing their own income, protecting the ruling elite and meeting the needs of the domestic markets.[13]

We can say that the second economic reason is the population increase in the Ottoman geography. Fernand Braudel stated that the Mediterranean population increased from 30-35 million to 60-70 million between 1500-1600.[14] Parallel to this population increase, the insufficient increase in the amount of arable land led to the emergence of the unemployed population.[15] These people left their places to look for work. In addition, the new technology that has become accessible has attracted the attention of these people. Moreover, the Ottoman State whose territory expanded used more and more mercenaries equipped with firearms.[16] That meant work. These people who received salaries during the war became a potential threat because they were unemployed when the war ended. If we give an example to this, Sekbans who moved to put Bayezid on the throne, climbed the mountain when they were defeated.[17] Unemployed soldiers who couldn’t find a job in Anatolia were joining bandits, extorting taxes from the peasants and doing havoc.[18]  In addition to the Levends, we can count the students who entered madrasahs in the hope that they will find a job from the double spoiled people When these students graduated, they realized that job opportunities weren’t what they thought. They could neither enter the court nor find any other job. They were collecting taxes from the peasants by pretending to be qadi, fief owner or regent.[19] The peasants who didn’t leave their land were overwhelmed by the levends, who become the kapıkuls of the beys, and the leaders of the bandits on the other. The peasants were also overwhelmed by the suhtes. In this direction, the Ottoman State allowed small-scale armament for the people to protect themselves. Karen Barkey argued that the Ottoman State was using it to achieve centralization.[20] The Ottoman State taxed the citizens who left their land. Despite this, the citizens, who were under pressure, left the land by risking to pay this tax.

As the third of the economic reasons, we can count the effect caused by bribery. Taking bribes and giving mansıps to incompetent people was another persecution indirectly. The person who briber to take office used the people’s taxes to cover the expense.[21] In addition, the Ottoman State shortened their term office for employment and similar reasons. This meant that most officials would fill their own pockets.

As the last of the economic reasons, we can show the deterioration of the fief system. With the decline of the fief owner sipahis, the governors tried to close the gap its with the forces such as the levend, sarıca and sekban they fed at their gates.[22] The Ottoman State started to give lands through iltizam system. Although this brings money in the short term, it has caused problems in the long term. Hammer also stated that giving fiefs and zeamets to someone other than the sipahis was disrupting the order.[23] If we look at all this, we can see the pressure on the peasant who doesn’t leave own land. The surprising thing is that the peasants didn’t unite to rebel against the Ottoman State. The peasant prefered to complain to the Ottoman State rather than to rebel. Karen Barkey attributed the reasons for the peasant’s inability to revolt to the policies of the Ottoman State and the peasants and officials who couldn’t form a unity in communication.[24] She said that the fief system of the Ottoman State, the subsistence policy and like that are effective in this. In addition, disagreement between the state officials has an effect on not forming a union.

2.      Other reasons

The first reason we will discuss under this heading is the wounds caused by long wars. The Ottoman-Iran war of 1578-1590 and the Ottoman-Austrian war of 1593-1606 raised serious issues in domestic politics and social order. These wars were tough and inconclusive. In the 16th century, the Ottoman State reached its natural borders. According to this, the Ottoman State was stopped by the Habsburgs in front of Vienna in the west and lay the Safavids on the Iranian plateau in the east. In addition, the Ottoman State dominated wide geography in a region surrounded by desert in Africa, Portuguese in the Indian Ocean and Russians in the north. So, Darü’l-harp was for away. Consequently, the soldier didn’t want to participate in these wars that brought little booty“because these troops had the desire for booty or for other rewords for their sacrifices in line of duty”[25]. The term has a name and no object can be evaluated in this context. When they participated in the war, as stated before, when the war was over and they didn’t get a salary, they were bandits instead of returning to their land.

Secondly, we can count the mistakes and failures of the State officials. After the death of Sokullu Mehmet Pasha, disturbances in the Ottoman State administration started to manifest themselves. During Murad, the third and Mehmed the third periods, the majority of the state officials had the idea of ‘personal interest’ instead of the idea of ‘homeland interest’. Therefore, there was a lot of bribery and favouritism in these periods. As explained above, all this increased the burden on the peasants. In the adaletname dated 1595-96, when the kadıs came out during the general inspection, they seized the property of the wealthy people. They were taking the gold and silver money of the people, saying that you found property or that Jelâlî left the property in you.[26]

Some practices of the State officials are also among the reasons of the Jelâlî rebellions. Mistakes arising from Sinan Pasha’s involvement of the State in the Austrian war in 1593 and the treatment he applied to those fleeing from this war are important in the growth of the rebellion.[27] As a matter of fact, Sinan Pasha ordered the fief of 30.000people who died and their property is taken by the State.[28] This turned banditry movements into a large-scale rebellion.

We know that Janissaries rebellion because of their salary with the depreciated akçe. Janissaries are the most prestigious and economically comfortable class among the Ottoman forces. We know that they have received some money under the name of cülüs tip, in’am and terakki, and with this money, they have closed the gap caused by devaluation. This situation was noticed by the Turkish people and with fief cavalry.[29] Mustafa Akdağ said that when it became a custom to give high mansions to the people of the hearths, the Turkish people also wanted to be Janissaries.[30] We can say that the rebel chiefs also benefited from this desire of the people during the Jelâlî rebellions. This may lead us to start the Jelâlî rebellions among the Turks, as stated before.

Oktay özel adds to them the historical heritage Babai, Bedreddin and Kızılbaş line.[31] We can say that this sympathy is one of the reasons why Kalenderoğlu, one of the leaders of Jelâl, joined the Iranian Şhah after he was defeated by the Ottoman State. Aysel Yıldız mentioned in a seminar I attended that the Jelâlî Rebellions had an eclectic structure. The historical legacy mentioned in the socio-political part of the table mentioned shows us the religious structure of the Jelâlî Rebellions, which Aysel Yıldız mentioned in the same seminar.

 

RESULT

As a result of the analyzed sources, the discussions on the Jelâlî rebellions were expressed, consequently, we can say that the Jelâlî rebellions have been effective since the end of the 16th century. We can take the reasons of the rebellions until the middle of the 16th century. The disorder seen in the Ottoman State has a great effect on the expansion of the Jelâlî rebellions. As a matter of fact, when the statements written in the Ottoman State are examined, the reasons I said. Therefore, it is possible to talk about a direct or indirect relationship between the Jelâlî rebellions and the stagnation of the Ottoman State.

 

        

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Peçevi İbrahim Efendi, Peçevi Tarihi, Vol.: 1,  Mersin, 1992.

ACUN, Fatma, “Celâlî İsyanları(1591-1611), Türkler, Vol.:  9, Ed.: Hasan Celâl Güzel, Kemal Çiçek, Salim Koca, Ankara, 2002, pp. 695-708.

AKDAĞ, Mustafa, Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası, Ankara.

-----------Mustafa, “Celali İsyanlarının Başlaması”, Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih- Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi,  Vol.: 4, No.: 1, Ankara, 1946, pp. 23-50.

BARKEY, Karen, Eşkıyalar ve Devlet Osmanlı Tarzı Devlet Merkezileşmesi, Tr.: Zeynep Altok, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul, 2016.

BRAUDEL, Fernand, II. Felipe Dönemi’nde Akdeniz ve Akdeniz dünyası, Vol.: 1, Tr.: Mehmet Ali Kılıçbay, Ankara, 1979.

CEZAR, Mustafa, Mufassal Osmanlı Tarihi Resimli-Haritalı, Vol.: 3, Ankara, 2011.

EMECEN, Feridun M., Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Kuruluş ve Yükseliş Tarihi (1300-1600), İstanbul, 2015.

GÜNDOĞDU, Birol, “Problems in The Interpretations of Ottoman Rebellions in the Early Modern Period: An Analysis and Evaluation of Existing Literature on The Ottoman Rebellions Between 1550 and 1821”, Osmanlı Araştırmaları/The Journal of Ottoman Studies, LI (2018), İstanbul, pp. 459-485.

HALAÇOĞLU, Yusuf, XIV-XVII. Yüzyıllarda Osmanlılarda Devlet Teşkilâtı ve Sosyal Yapı, Ankara, 2014.

Hammer, Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi, Vol.:  4, İstanbul.

ITZKOWITZ, Norman, Ottoman Empire and Islamiç Tradition, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1972.

İLGÜREL, Mücteba, “Celâli İsyanları”, DİA, Vol.: 7, İstanbul, 1993, pp. 252-257.

İNALCIK, Halil, “Adâletnâmeler”, Belgeler, Vol: 2, No: 3-4, Ankara, 1993, pp. 49-145.

------------------, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Kuruluş ve İnkişafı Devrinde Türkiye’nin İktisadi Vaziyeti Üzerinde Bir Tetkik Münasebetiyle”, Belleten, Vol: 15, No: 60, 1951, pp. 629-684.

-------------------, The Ottoman Empire and Europe The Ottoman Empire and İts Place in European History, İstanbul, 2019.

ÖZ, Mehmet, Kanun-ı Kadimin Peşinde Osmanlı’da Çözülme ve Gelenekçi Yorumcuları, İstanbul, 2010.

ÖZEL, Oktay, “The Reign of Violence: The celalis c. 1550-1700”, The Ottoman World, 2012, pp. 184-202.

 

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[1] Birol Gündoğdu, “Problems in the Interpretations of Ottoman Rebellions in the Early Modern Period: An Analysis and Evaluation of Existing Literature on the Ottoman Rebellions between 1550 and 1821”, Osmanlı Araştırmaları/The Journal of Ottoman Studies, LI (2018), İstanbul, p. 472.

[2] Mücteba İlgürel, “Celâli İsyanları”, DİA, vol.: 7, İstanbul, 1993, p. 252.

[3] Peçevi İbrahim Efendi, Peçevi Tarihi 1, p. 242.

[4] Feridun M. Emecen, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Kuruluş ve Yükseliş Tarihi(1300-1600), İstanbul, 2015, p. 407.

[5] Mustafa Akdağ, Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası, Ankara, p. 156.

[6] Mustafa Akdağ, “Celali İsyanlarının Başlaması”, Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih- Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi, vol.: 4, no.: 1, Ankara, 1946, p. 23.

[7] Ibidem, p. 28.

[8] Karen Barkey, Eşkıyalar ve Devlet Osmanlı Tarzı Devlet Merkezileşmesi, Tr.: Zeynep Altok, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul, 2016, p. 1.

[9] Halil İnalcık, “Adâletnâmeler”, Belgeler, Vol.: 2, No.: 3-4, Ankara, 1993, p. 78.

[10] Halil İnalcık, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Kuruluş ve İnkişafı Devrinde Türkiye’nin İktisadi Vaziyeti Üzerinde Bir Tetkik Münasebetiyle”, Belleten, Vol.: 15, No.: 60, 1951, pp. 660-661

[11] Oktay Özel, “The Reign of Violence: The celalis c.1550-1700”, The Ottoman World, 2012, p. 185.

[12] Fatma Acun, “Celâlî İsyanları(1591-1611), Türkler, Vol.: 9, Ed.: Hasan Celâl Güzel, Kemal Çiçek, Salim Koca, Ankara, 2002, p. 1277.

[13]Barkey, ibidem, pp. 54-55.

[14] Fernand Braudel, II. Felipe Dönemi’nde Akdeniz ve Akdeniz dünyası, vol.: 1, Tr.: Mehmet Ali Kılıçbay, Ankara, 1979, p. 486.

[15] Mehmet Öz, Kanun-ı Kadimin Peşinde Osmanlı’da Çözülme ve Gelenekçi Yorumcuları, İstanbul, 2010, p. 44.

[16]Barkey, ibidem, p. 156.

 

[17]Akdağ, ibidem, p. 156.

[18] Norman Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamiç Tradition, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1972, p. 93.

[19]Barkey, ibidem, p. 161.

[20]Ibidem, p. 167.

[21] Mustafa Cezar, Mufassal Osmanlı Tarihi Resimli-Haritalı, vol.: 3, Ankara, 2011, p. 1379.

[22] Yusuf Halaçoğlu, XIV-XVII. Yüzyıllarda Osmanlılarda Devlet Teşkilâtı ve Sosyal Yapı, Ankara, 2014, p. 58.

[23] Hammer, Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi, vol.: 4, İstanbul, p. 190.

[24]Barkey, ibidem.

[25] Halil İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire and Europe The Ottoman Empire and İts Place in European History, İstanbul, 2019, p. 18.

[26] İnalcık, adaletname, p. 78.

[27] Cezar, ibidem,  p. 1377.

[28] Öz, ibidem,  p. 127.

[29] Cezar, ibidem, p. 1676.

[30] Akdağ, ibidem, p. 31.

[31]Özel, ibidem, p. 192.